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A number of studies on the S&P 500 index options market claim that the no arbitrage assumption 
cannot be rejected for this market because either the martingale restriction defined in Longstaff 
(1995) cannot be rejected by the data, or, even when it is rejected, a large proportion of the 
violation can be explained by market friction factors. The present study singles out the effect of 
market inefficiency from market friction by testing the martingale restriction for the KOSPI 200 
index options market, which is the most liquid and active options market in the world. Not only 
using the parametric methods adopted in previous studies but also using the nonparametric 
methods which enable us to avoid the model misspecification problem, we empirically present 
clear evidence of a violation of the martingale restriction. In addition, in contrast to the S&P 500 
options market, regression analyses and robustness tests indicate that market friction factors can 
explain only a small portion of the percentage differences between option-implied and market-
observed index prices. Overall, the results do not support the basic no-arbitrage assumption or the 
market efficiency in the KOSPI 200 options market. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important arguments under no-arbitrage option pricing theory is that if a financial 
market is frictionless and allows for no arbitrage opportunities, then there exists at least one risk-
neutral probability measure under which the underlying asset price discounted at the risk-free rate 
follows the martingale process. Therefore, a violation of this property—first termed “internal 
consistency” by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and later referred to as “martingale restriction” by 
Longstaff (1995)—in a financial market can be attributed to the existence of arbitrage 
opportunities and/or market friction. Both have important implications for the popular risk-neutral 
valuation approach in derivatives pricing and regulators of the corresponding market, and thus, 
testing the martingale restriction is a matter of great importance for scholars, practitioners, and 
policy makers. 
One obvious way to test the validity of the martingale restriction is to compare the market-
observed price of the underlying asset with the price implied from its derivatives (e.g., options 
contracts). Option-implied price is normally computed as the (discounted) first moment of the risk 
neutral density (RND) of the underlying asset. Depending on the assumptions made about the 
functional form of the RND, previous studies typically adopt one of two approaches. The first 
extracts the spot price based on specific option pricing models, mainly the Black-Scholes (BS) 
model, which assumes a lognormal RND. However, a rejection of the martingale restriction based 
on the simple BS model remains questionable because the log-normality assumption is too 
restrictive. Therefore, the second approach relaxes this assumption to allow for more general forms 
of the density function. For example, Longstaff (1995) adopts a four-parameter Hermite 
polynomial to approximate the RND and estimates parameters by using four call prices closest to 
the money. Alternatively, Brenner and Eom (1997) consider a Laguerre polynomial series as an 
approximation of the density function. They show that, the Hermite polynomial expansion in 
Longstaff (1995) can lead to pricing bias if the true density function is not lognormal. 
No matter which of the two above approaches is taken, the RND used for testing the martingale 
restriction is parametrically defined, and hence is subject to the model misspecification problem. 
To obtain a rough estimate of the impact of model misspecification on the results, Brenner and 
Eom (1997) report that the Laguerre density estimator can reduce the mean percentage difference 
by approximately 80% more than the lognormal specification and approximately 10% more than 
the Hermite polynomial. Strong and Xu (1999) also report that the percentage price difference is 
about 8 times larger under the lognormal than under a generalized RND. To avoid this problem, the 
present study applies the recent advances in the nonparametric estimation of the RND from option 
prices (see Bahra, 1997; Jackwerth, 1999; Figlewski, 2008 for detailed reviews). The 
nonparametric methods adopted in this study are the kernel regression method described in Aït-
Sahalia and Lo (1998) and the implied volatility smoothing method in Shimko (1993) because of 
their advantages over other nonparametric methods. For comparison, we also investigate the 
martingale restriction by using parametric methods based on the BS model, the Hermite 
polynomial RND in Longstaff (1995) and the Laguerre polynomial RND in Brenner and Eom 
(1997). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the martingale restriction 
property using nonparametric methods. 
Empirical results of testing the martingale restriction so far have been mixed and the validity of 
the restriction seems to vary across markets. Manaster and Rendleman (1982) and Longstaff (1995) 
examine the S&P 100 options market and claim strong evidence of a violation of the martingale 
restriction. To avoid the American and wild-card features of the S&P 100 options market, Strong 
and Xu (1999) conduct a similar test using S&P 500 index calls and puts over the 1990-1994 
period and claim an economically insignificant rejection of the martingale restriction. Brenner and 
Eom (1997) also examine the S&P 500 options market and they fail to reject the martingale 
restriction. On the other hand, Neumann and Schlag (1996) consider the DAX options market and 
reject the martingale restriction for the first half of 1994. Turvey and Komar (2006) test a variation 
of the martingale restriction for the live cattle options traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) and find that the option-implied market price of risk varies systematically across strike 
prices and randomly over time, suggesting a clear violation of the martingale restriction. 
In cases of the rejections, interpreting the results is important. Longstaff (1995) implements a 
regression analysis, which controls for the moneyness, time-to-maturity, and volatility biases of the 
BS model. He demonstrates that the percentage differences are largely due to market friction 
factors, including bid-ask spreads of option prices, trading volume, and other liquidity factors. 
Brenner and Eom (1997) and Neumann and Schlag (1996) make similar conclusions that violations 
of the martingale restriction in their respective markets are also due to market frictions. Based on 
these observations, a general conclusion in the current literature is that no arbitrage coupled with a 
general form of distribution is a reasonable assumption for option pricing in these markets. 
Unlike the above studies, this study considers the KOSPI 200 options market, which is the single 
most liquid and actively traded derivatives market in the world. The motivation is obvious: given 
the negligible frictions in this market, if the martingale restriction ever gets rejected, then it is most 
likely due to the failure of the no-arbitrage assumption. Hence, testing the martingale restriction for 
this market offers a unique opportunity to test for market efficiency. This study is also motivated 
by the fact that previous studies generally employ outdated data (up to 1994), and global financial 
markets and the nature of their microstructures have undergone substantial changes over the last 
two decades. Thus, the martingale restriction needs to be tested by using more recent data. 
The empirical results of this study clearly reject the martingale restriction for the 2002-2010 
period. Furthermore, a regression of percentage differences between option-implied and market-
observed underlying prices on market friction factors indicates that, inconsistent with developed 
markets such as the S&P 500 and DAX options markets, the differences in the KOSPI 200 options 
market are related more to speculation than to market friction, casting doubt on the efficiency of 
this market. The results and conclusions are robust to the use of KOSPI 200 index futures instead 
of the KOSPI 200 index as the underlying asset. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theory underlying the 
empirical test and summarizes the parametric and nonparametric methods used in this study. 
Section 3 describes the property of the KOSPI 200 options market and discusses the data. Section 4 
presents the empirical results for the martingale restriction. A robustness check is undertaken in 
Section 5 and Section 6 concludes this study. 
 
 
2. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Review of Theory 
Consider a financial market over a finite investment horizon (0, T). The market has one zero 
coupon bond with a riskless continuous compounding interest rate r1, one unit of traded underlying 
asset St and derivatives with payoff functions F(ST). The probabilistic structure of the market is 
based on a probability space (Ω, B, P), where Ω is the payoff space of the underlying asset, B the 
sigma algebra generated by the payoffs in Ω, and P an objective probability measure assigned on 
                                                 
1 This study calculates the risk-free rate by using the 91-day certificate deposit (CD) rate. 
(Ω, B, P). Let It denote the information set faced by investors at time t, then the payoff space гt 
={πt∈It : E[πt2|It-1]<∞} where πt denotes an asset payoff at time t. That is, the payoff space гt is the 
set of all random variables with finite conditional second moments given the previous period 
information. Attention is restricted to derivatives with payoff F(St)∈гt. 
Harrison and Kreps (1979) show that to avoid arbitrage the pricing operator mapping the date-T 
payoffs to date-0 prices can be characterized as an expectation operator by Riesz representation 
theorem. That is, under the frictionless-market and no-arbitrage assumptions, the price H of a 
derivative asset is given as follows: 
 
H=EP[ζ(t,T)F(ST)|It]=∫0∞ζ(t,T)F(ST)fP(ST|It)dST                                   (1) 
 
where τ=T-t is the time to maturity, ST the price of the underlying asset at the maturity date T, 
ξ(t,T) a market pricing kernel function, and fP(ST |It) the date-t probability density for the date-T 
payoff under the probability measure P. Since erτξ(t,T) is non-negative, square-integrable, and has 
an expected value of one, a direct application of the Radon-Nikodym theorem changes the original 
measure P to a new measure Q and simplifies equation (1) to the following: 
 
H=EQ[e-rτF(ST)|It]=e-rτ∫0∞F(ST)fQ(ST|It)dST                                          (2) 
 
The new probability measure Q is called a risk neutral measure if and only if the underlying 
asset can be priced by the pricing equation (2), i.e. the underlying price is internally consistent: 
 
St= EQ[e-rτST|It] =e-rτ∫0∞ST fQ(ST|It)dST      (3) 
 
That is, under the market frictionless assumption, the derivatives-implied underlying asset price 
should equal the actual market value of the underlying asset. This is the definition of the 
martingale restriction proposed in Longstaff (1995). Obviously, a violation of the martingale 
restriction then implies the existence of arbitrage opportunities and/or market friction. Our 
approach to testing the martingale restriction involves calibrating (parametrically) or estimating 
(non-parametrically) the risk-neutral density function of the underlying from option prices by using 
Equation (2) and then computing Equation (3) to compare the option-implied price of the 
underlying with the market price. 
We classify the methods for estimating the option-implied risk-neutral density into two 
categories—parametric and nonparametric methods—based on whether a specific form of the risk-
neutral density is assumed. In later sections, we use the words “methods” and “models” 
interchangeably. 
 
2.2 Parametric Methods 
We select the classical BS model, Longstaff’s (1995) four-factor Hermite polynomial and Brenner 
and Eom’s (1997) Laguerre polynomial series to represent the parametric methods. European 
options under the BS model are valued as follows: 
 
C=N(d1)St -N(d2)Ke-rτ, P=N(-d2)Ke-rτ-N(-d1)St     (4) 
where C and P denote the prices of call and put options, respectively, N(.) is the cumulative 
distribution of a standard normal distribution, σ the volatility of the return on the underlying asset, 
St the price of the dividend-adjusted2 underlying asset at time t, d1=[ln(St /K)+(r+σ2/2)τ]/σ√τ, and 
d2=d1-σ√τ. Then the spot price implied by the BS model can be calibrated and compared with the 
market price of underlying assets. Realizing that the BS model may be subject to the problem of 
model misspecification, Longstaff (1995) extends the lognormal density assumption to a four-
factor Edgeworth expansion, a general form that includes the BS model, Merton’s (1973) 
stochastic interest rate model, and Merton’s (1976) jump diffusion model as its special cases. 
Let Z=(ln(ST)-μ)/σ, where μ is the conditional mean. The risk-neutral density of Z is assumed to 
belong to an Edgeworth expansion family of density functions: 
 
q(Z)={1+β(Z3-3Z)+γ(Z4-6Z2+3)}      (5) 
 
where β and γ are parameters indicating the skewness and kurtosis of the price of the underlying 
asset. Note that Equation (5) reduces to the standard normal density in the BS model when both β 
and γ are set to zero. A call option is priced as follows: 
 
C=e-rτ∫0∞max(0, eμ+σZ-K)q(Z)dZ       (6) 
 
The price of a put option can be derived based on the put-call parity 
 
P=Ke-rτ-St+C           (7) 
 
Once the parameters are estimated, the first moment of the risk-neutral density is given by 
 
Et[ST]=exp(μ+σ2/2)(1+βσ3+γσ4)               (8)                                    
 
and the implied underlying price is expressed as follows: 
                                                 
2 In this study, St always denotes the dividend-adjusted spot price. 
 
St=exp(-rτ+μ+σ2/2)(1+βσ3+γσ4)        (9) 
 
Brenner and Eom (1997) approximate the density function of the underlying asset by a Laguerre 
polynomial series instead of Longstaff’s (1995) Hermite polynomial series. They derive the 
equation for a call option as 
 
            (10) 
 
In Equation (10), 
, μj=Et(STj), 
θ=VAR(ST)/μ1, δ=μ1/θ, I(.) is an incomplete gamma function, and Г(.) is a gamma function. The put 
option value can be calculated using the put-call parity. By using up to the fourth order (k=4), 
Brenner and Eom (1997) estimate the parameters and the implied underlying price as St=exp(-
rτ)μ1. 
 
2.3 Nonparametric Methods 
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) show that the risk-neutral density ft(ST) can be obtained from 
option prices by taking the second-order derivative of the option pricing function with respect to 
the strike price K: 
 
          (11) 
   
A number of nonparametric methods have been proposed for estimating the option pricing 
function H. In this study, we choose kernel regression and implied volatility smoothing as the main 
nonparametric methods. As shown in Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998), kernel regression is better suited 
for hypothesis testing and requires less restrictive assumptions than other methods do. Shimko 
(1993) argues that fitting/smoothing the implied volatility curve is more accurate and convenient 
than fitting/smoothing the pricing function directly because the implied volatility curve is better 
behaved than the pricing function. 
Given a set of historical European option prices Hi and accompanying variables Vi=(Si, Ki, ri, τi),3 
let h be the bandwidth used for the kernel regression. The estimator of H conditional on V is given 
as the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator: 
 
                                    (12) 
 
where n is the sample size and k((V-Vi)/h) the kernel function. In this study, we choose the second-
order Gaussian kernel4 as 
 
            (13) 
 
and choose h by minimizing the least squares cross-validation.5 
Because we have four explanatory variables, our multivariate kernel function becomes the 
product of four univariate kernels6, giving the following full nonparametric pricing function7 
 
      (14) 
 
Differentiating the function twice numerically generates the risk-neutral density implicit in option 
prices. 
On the other hand, Shimko (1993) smoothes the implied volatility structure by the parabolic 
function of the strike price: 
                                                 
3 For notational convenience, we suppress the time variable t. 
4 The choice of kernel function or kernel order usually affects the speed of convergence of the 
estimator to the true function, but typically has little influence on the end result, whereas that of the 
bandwidth h determines the accuracy of the final outcome. See Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998) for a 
discussion. Therefore we use the popular Gaussian kernel for the whole analysis and optimize the 
parameter h for each data set. 
5 See, for example, Stone (1984). 
6 The kernel function k(Vi) can take a multidimensional form and use the same bandwidth h for all 
variables Vi=(Si, Ki, ri, τi). Alternatively, a multiplicative kernel k(Vi)=kS(Si)×kK(Ki)×kr(ri)×kτ(τi) can 
be assumed where each univariate kernel has its own bandwidth h. Uller (1997) analyzes the 
asymptotics of this latter solution. Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998), and Li and Zhao (2009) use it for 
S&P 500 options and interest rate caps. The option pricing error analysis in Section 5.3 
demonstrates its accuracy. 
7 We also test the kernel regression method by fitting implied volatilities instead of option prices 
because this allows us to reduce the dimension of the nonparametric pricing function from four to 
three. We obtain similar results. 
 
σ(K,τ)=A0(τ)+A1(τ)K+A2(τ)K2          (15) 
 
By fitting the parameters A0, A1, and A2 with least squares, we can generate a smooth volatility 
curve for all K and τ. The smoothed volatility is then used to compute a series of option prices via 
the BS equation,8 and the risk-neutral density function is solved analytically as follows: 
 
ft(ST)=-n(d2)[d2K-(A1+2A2K)(1-d2d2K)-2A2K]      (16) 
 
where d1k=(-1/Kν)+(1-d1/ν)(A1+2A2K), d2K=d1K -(A1+2A2K), ν=σ√τ, d1and d2 are the same as those 
in the BS equation and n(.) is the density distribution of a standard normal variable. 
 
 
3. THE KOSPI 200 OPTIONS MARKET AND SAMPLE DATA 
As discussed in the Introduction section, testing the martingale restriction for the KOSPI 200 index 
options market provides a unique opportunity for testing market efficiency because of its vast 
liquidity and negligible transaction costs. Despite its short history, the KOSPI 200 options market 
has become the single most active derivatives market in the world. As shown in Table 1, which 
presents the trading volumes (in terms of the number of contracts) for the top 10 equity index 
futures and options products and their respective exchanges for the recent year of the sample data 
(i.e., 2010), the KOSPI 200 options market clearly dominates others in terms of trading activity. 
In addition to its ample liquidity, the KOSPI 200 options market requires negligible transaction 
costs. For equity trading, individuals should pay substantial taxes and commissions for trading, and 
institutions should pay membership and exchange fees. By contrast, for options trading, individual 
investors are exempt from taxes and often do not pay commissions.9 In addition, membership and 
exchange fees are lower in the options market. Further, in the options market, the bid-ask spread, 
which is widely used to measure transaction costs and market liquidity, is very narrow—typically 
one or two times the minimum tick size (see Ahn, Kang & Ryu, 2008, 2010). 
Interestingly, the KOSPI 200 options market is also known for highly speculative options traders 
who tend to be easily influenced by behavioral and psychological biases, which may lead to 
systematic pricing bias in the implied spot price even with no market friction. Sophisticated and 
informed institutional investors are dominant market players in developed countries’ derivatives 
                                                 
8 Note that Shimko (1993) does not require the BS model to be correct. The equation is used only 
to interpolate implied volatility, not to determine the market price of options. 
9 Investment firms that provide individual investors with a home trading system typically require 
very small commissions. Recently, an increasing number of firms have been waiving such 
commissions. 
markets, whereas domestic individuals are very active investors in the KOSPI 200 options market. 
As shown in Table 2, which presents trading volume by investor type, domestic individual 
investors account for more than 42% of the total trading volume for the sample period. Further, 
these individual investors focus on out-of-the-money (OTM) and especially deep-OTM options, 
which are typically used as high-leverage speculative trading tools (see Ahn et al., 2008, 2010).10 
Again, this coexistence of extreme liquidity, low transaction costs, and abundant speculative 
activity in the KOSPI 200 options market raises the question of whether these imply the existence 
of arbitrage opportunities in the case of a violation of the martingale restriction for the market. 
The maturity dates of KOSPI 200 options are set as the second Thursday of three consecutive 
near-term months and one nearest month from the quarterly cycle (March, June, September, and 
December). For instance, if today is April 1, then the maturity months are April, May, June, and 
September. Although these four types of option contracts (classified by their maturity dates) are 
always listed, only the nearest maturity contracts are actively traded on the Korea Exchange (KRX) 
(see Ryu, 2011).11 Therefore, daily data on only the nearest maturity contracts from January 2002 
to December 2010 are considered in this study. Then options data are matched with these daily 
index prices. For each trading day, option contracts are screened with the following six filters. 
First, options with fewer than 30 intraday transactions are excluded. Second, bid and ask prices 
should exceed the minimum tick size. Third, closing prices of options should exceed the no-
arbitrage lower bounds and lie between 0.03 and 25 points. Equation (17) (Equation (18)) 
represents the no-arbitrage lower bound for call (put) options: 
 
Ct ≥ Max(St-Ke-rτ,0)           (17) 
 
Pt ≥ Max(Ke-rτ-St,0)           (18) 
 
Fourth, BS implied volatility should be greater than 0.05 and less than 0.95. Fifth, the absolute 
value of option moneyness, classically defined as |K/St-1|, should be less than 0.1. Finally, we 
exclude those trading days with fewer than 8 option contracts. 
Table 3 summarizes the daily statistics for the KOSPI 200 index and the call and put options. 
The average (median) number of calls and puts traded daily is 9.97 (9) and 10.68 (10), 
                                                 
10 The Korean options market adopts two different tick sizes based on option prices. If the option 
price exceeds 3 points (i.e., KRW 300,000), then the minimum tick size is 0.05 points (i.e., KRW 
5,000), whereas the tick size is 0.01 points (i.e., KRW 1,000) if the option price is less than 3 
points. 
11 In an analysis not discussed in this study, we further exclude those contracts with less than three 
days to the next maturity date and re-test all models. The main conclusions remain, indicating that 
even when obviously speculative market behavior, which is often found around maturity dates, is 
excluded, ample arbitrage activity remains in the market. 
respectively. The average moneyness12 is negative for calls (-0.618), but positive for puts (1.344). 
Because only the nearest maturity contracts are used, both calls and puts have a relatively short 
time to maturity. The maximum time to maturity is 0.0984 years (approximately a month), and the 
median time to maturity is 0.0407 years (approximately two weeks). Over the sample period, the 
KOSPI 200 index fluctuates from the minimum value of 65.58 to the maximum value of 168.23. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Tests of the Martingale Restriction 
We test the martingale restriction by using the methods described in Section 2. As shown in Table 
4, the results clearly indicate a violation of the martingale restriction for the sample. The null 
hypothesis for call options is rejected by all methods at the 99% level of significance, and for put 
options at the 95% level of significance. Three out of five models report positive mean and median 
percentage differences for call options, and two models report positive mean differences for put 
options. 
More specifically, the BS model has an average percentage difference of 0.141% for calls and 
0.206% for puts. The Longstaff model gives the smallest mean absolute percentage differences (-
0.058% for calls and -0.032% for puts) among the parametric methods. Between the nonparametric 
methods, the Shimko method provides smaller mean percentage differences: 0.032% for calls and 
0.029% for puts, indicating a price difference of only 0.06 points. However, this is still substantial 
in that spreads in the options market are often just a tick (i.e., 0.01 points). The kernel regression 
(KR) method produces the largest mean percentage difference for calls (1.291%) and the second 
largest difference for puts (-1.183%). As shown in Table 5, which lists those parameters for both 
kernel regressions on calls and puts, the high R2 values demonstrate the accuracy of the kernel 
regression method for option price estimation. 
The results in Table 4 suggest that it is more expensive to trade the underlying asset on the 
options market than to trade it directly on the spot market. Longstaff (1995) explains that these 
relatively “expensive” option prices may reflect higher transaction costs in options markets. 
However, this explanation may not be applied to the KOSPI 200 options market because its bid-ask 
spread is very narrow and transaction costs (e.g., commissions, taxes, and transaction fees) are 
negligible. We further investigate this conjecture in Section 4.2. 
 
4.2 The Role of Market Friction in Price Differences 
Option-implied prices of underlying assets can be different from market-observed spot prices 
because of market friction. Longstaff (1995) regresses differences between implied and observed 
                                                 
12 Here, the moneyness for call (put) options is defined as the average difference between their 
index value (strike) and strike price (index value) for a given day. 
index prices on several variables for market friction, including the average bid-ask spread, open 
interest, and total option trading volume, while controlling for the time to maturity, moneyness, 
and the current and first two lagged values of absolute daily returns on the S&P 100 index. He 
finds that all market friction variables are significant and that the R2 value is as high as 64.4%, 
demonstrating that market friction factors are major reasons behind the violation of the martingale 
restriction. By contrast, using S&P 500 options data, Brenner and Eom (1997) find no relationship 
between estimated price differences and market friction for their proposed general distribution of 
the risk-neutral density. 
In this section, we regress the percentage differences between implied and observed underlying 
prices on several measures of market friction for KOSPI 200 options, including the average bid-ask 
adjusted spread, total open interest, total trading volume, and the total number of options used to 
compute price differences.13 Table 6 reports the results. The estimate for bid-ask adjusted spread is 
insignificant for the BS and Longstaff model for call options and for the Shimko models for put 
options. However, the coefficient is negative for call options and positive for put options. The 
coefficient for total open interest is negative and significant for four out of five models for call 
options, and three models for put options at the 99% significance level. The negative sign is as 
expected because as the total open interest increases, the options market becomes more liquid. The 
total trading volume has a similar significance level with the total open interest, but has 
coefficients with mixed sign. The sign of the coefficient for the number of options is mixed with 
most being positive, which is inconsistent with the significant negative relationship reported in 
Longstaff (1995). The kernel regression model shows the highest R2 values: 24.6% for calls and 
36.4% for puts, followed by the BS model (20.2% for calls and 12.5% for puts). The Brenner and 
Eom model has the lowest R2 value: 1.2% for calls, and 1.4% for puts, indicating the poor 
explanatory power of these market friction variables. 
To further verify the validity of our results, following Longstaff (1995), we include several 
control variables in the regression to capture any potential model biases: the average value of the 
time to maturity for the time-to-expiration bias; the average value of moneyness for the option 
leverage bias; and the current, first, and second lagged values of absolute daily returns on the 
KOSPI 200 index for the volatility bias. Table 7 reports the regression coefficients and p-values for 
call and put options. As expected, including these variables does not significantly increase the R2 
value. The Longstaff, Brenner and Eom, and Shimko models all show an adjusted R2 value less 
than 10%. Further, the results indicate that when these biases are controlled for, the explanatory 
performance of the market friction variables is weakened in general. For instance, the signs of the 
coefficients for both bid-ask adjusted spread and total open interest become mixed. 
                                                 
13 The bid-ask spread is adjusted by dividing it by the option price. Scaling the spread is more 
meaningful given the narrow spread for KOSPI 200 options. 
In sum, our regression analysis shows that, at best, the market friction only marginally explains 
the violation of the martingale restriction for the KOSPI 200 options market. This raises several 
possible interpretations. First, one may argue that any test of the martingale restriction should 
consider how often the implied index price falls within the bid-ask spread of the underlying asset. 
However, considering that the KOPSI200 index consists of the most liquid 200 stocks in Korea and 
that their bid-ask spreads are usually quite narrow, this may not be a valid argument. In addition, a 
trader attempting to take advantage of a violation of the martingale restriction is likely to long the 
underlying asset and simultaneously short a synthesized underlying asset by using options and risk-
free assets, while a short-seller may take the opposite position. Hence, the bid-ask spread of the 
underlying asset is already reflected in the option price, rendering this argument irrelevant. Second, 
one may claim that the KOSPI 200 options market’s ample liquidity may induce options traders to 
willingly accept higher premiums. However, as already shown in Table 6, with the effects of total 
open interest and the total trading volume of KOSPI 200 options controlled for, the violation of the 
martingale restriction is still little explained. Third, crash-averse institutional investors’ excess 
demand may drive up option prices. Institutional investors may buy OTM puts to hedge against 
potential crashes in futures markets. However, this argument does not explain the low adjusted R2 
value in Table 7, in which we control for the effects of moneyness and the number of puts traded 
on each particular day. 
The above discussion leads back to the initial conjecture proposed in the Introduction section, 
that is, a violation of the martingale restriction may be largely due to arbitrage activity. In other 
words, the empirical evidence suggests that the KOSPI 200 options market is not efficient. It is 
well known that many domestic individual investors with little trading experience and knowledge 
habitually buy KOSPI 200 options for simple and speculative reasons. In particular, there are 
active buyers of OTM and deep-OTM options, although these options are very unlikely to provide 
positive payoffs (see Kim & Ryu, 2012). Individuals buy these “cheap” options as if they are 
buying a lottery ticket or betting at a casino.14 Hence, it is reasonable to expect that under these 
situations, sophisticated investors (e.g., foreign institutions) can take advantage of the differences 
between option-implied and market-observed spot prices to make arbitrage profits if they carefully 
monitor the price movements of options and index. 
 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
In this section we support the conclusions in section 4 by performing robustness checks. We first 
use futures as alternative underlying assets, and then divide the data sample into two periods, 
                                                 
14 These views are also based on opinions of options market experts in Korea’s leading financial 
institutions. In this regard, the authors are grateful to an executive director of SK Research Institute 
and a vice president of a leading bank. 
before and after June, 2007, when the financial crisis began. Finally, we examine the accuracy of 
all models for KOSPI 200 option pricing. 
 
5.1 Alternative Underlying Assets 
Our test using KOSPI 200 index prices may have some limitations. First, we assume that investors 
can forecast future dividends perfectly until the maturity of each option contract, but this 
assumption may not reflect the reality.15 Second, KOSPI 200 index prices may not reflect the 
fundamental value of the underlying asset because of problems related to non-synchronous trading 
and stale prices, which often arise when index prices are used. 
We conduct the same empirical tests by using KOSPI 200 futures contracts to address these 
issues. KOSPI 200 futures contracts are very actively traded and the options and futures markets 
have the same closing time. In practice, traders often use cheaper futures contracts instead of the 
index itself to hedge index options. Therefore, this type of robustness check is widely employed 
(e.g., Longstaff, 1995; Brenner & Eom, 1997; Strong & Xu, 1999). 
Although KOSPI 200 options and futures share many features, their maturity dates can be 
different. The maturity months for KOSPI 200 futures are March, June, September, and December, 
and thus, we select only those trading days on which options and futures contracts have the same 
nearest maturity dates. Table 8 reports the results for KOSPI 200 index futures. Largely consistent 
with the test using index values, all methods except the Brenner and Eom reject the null hypothesis 
for call options, and all reject it for put options at the 99% level of significance. The Longstaff 
model rejects the null hypothesis at the 99% level of significance for puts and provides positive 
price percentage differences (compared with the less significant differences in Table 4). 
Similar results are obtained when we regress the percentage differences between implied and 
observed index futures prices on the variables for market friction. Table 9 presents the coefficient 
estimates and p-values16. The bid-ask adjusted spread becomes less significant, the total open 
interest, total trading volume and number of options have similar significance levels as for the 
underlying index. The explanatory power (R2 value) changes only slightly, for example from 
20.15% to 22.39% for calls and from 12.52% to 19.94% for puts for the BS model. 
 
5.2 Sub-period Analysis 
To investigate whether our findings are heavily biased on the exceptional market turbulence due to 
the recent financial crisis17, we divide the sample periods into two sub-samples, one from January 
                                                 
15 Nevertheless, this assumption may have negligible effects because the time to maturity for 
options is typically less than a month and the average value of present dividends is much lower 
than the level of the KOSPI 200 index price. 
16 We also conduct a full regression using index futures values controlling additional variables as in 
Table 8. The results are similar, so we omit them. The results are available upon request. 
17 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this concern. 
2002 to May 2007, and the other one from June 2007 to December 2010, as June 2007 is 
acknowledged as the start of the financial crisis. Then we re-conduct all tests using the two sub-
samples separately. 
Table 10 reports the results of percentage price differences between option-implied and observed 
values of the underlying index for two sub-samples18. All models except the Shimko model reject 
the null hypothesis at the 95% level of significance for the first sub-sample, and all models except 
the Longstaff model reject it at the 99% level of significance for the second sub-sample. The 
Brenner and Eom model returns similar t-statistics for the two sub-samples, the BS model has a 
larger t-statistic (thus rejects it more significantly) for the second sub-sample than the first sub-
sample, while the Kernel regression has a larger t-statistic for the first sub-sample. The distinct t-
statistics across samples may be attributed to the model characteristics. For instance, skewness and 
kurtosis are more pronounced in a volatile period than in a stable one, and, as a result, the distance 
between option-implied values and the underlying index values depends on how well the model 
can capture these characteristics in the distribution of the underlying asset. 
 
5.3 Option Pricing Performance 
We further examine the option pricing accuracy of all five models in this section, considering the 
importance of an accurate valuation for the validity of conclusions. Table 11 reports the statistics 
for pricing errors, defined as the differences between observed market prices and model prices of 
options. Not surprisingly, the BS model has the largest pricing error with a mean -0.0119 and a 
median -0.0124 for calls and a mean 0.0338 and a median 0.0399 for puts, compared with the 
smallest pricing error achieved by the Longstaff model for calls (mean=0.0021, median=0.0016), 
and by the Shimko model for puts (mean=0.0014, median=0.0008). These small pricing errors 
confirm that the models used are highly accurate and that violations of the martingale restriction 
are not likely due to model biases. 
Overall, we find that the violation of the martingale restriction is robust to using index futures as 




In this study, we test the martingale restriction for the KOSPI 200 options market. To avoid any 
model misspecification, we use both parametric and nonparametric methods to estimate the risk-
neutral density function. We then employ this function to compute option-implied index prices. 
Percentage differences between option-implied and market-observed values and t-test results 
suggest a violation of the martingale restriction for the market for most of the methods employed. 
                                                 
18 We find qualitatively the same regression results on market friction variables for the two sub-
samples as for the whole sample, results are available upon request. 
The regression analysis indicates that the variables for market friction, including bid-ask adjusted 
spread, total trading volume, open interest, and the number of options, account for only a small 
portion of the percentage differences. After considering several alternative explanations, we 
conclude that the Korean options market, unlike its U.S. counterpart, has substantial arbitrage 
opportunities and is thus not efficient. 
Our conclusions are robust. First, we use both parametric and nonparametric methods to test the 
martingale restriction, whereas previous studies consider only parametric methods. Second, we 
divide the data sample into two sub-samples to avoid possible bias due to market condition. Third, 
we replace index values by index futures values to avoid problems related to non-synchronous 
trading and stale prices. Further, for the regression analyses, we control for time-to-maturity, 
moneyness, and volatility biases to examine the percentage differences between implied and 
observed underlying values. Our finding of the inefficiency of the KOSPI 200 options market has 
critical implications for both investors and regulator. 
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Table 1 
Top 10 Index Futures and Options Worldwide 
Rank Contract Index Multiplier 2010 
1 KOSPI200 options, KRX KRW 100,000 3,525,898,562
2 E-mini S&P 500 index futures, CME USD 50 555,328,670 
3 SPDR S&P 500 ETF options, multiple exchanges - 456,863,881 
4 S&P CNX Nifty index options, NSE (India) INR 100 529,773,463 
5 Euro Stoxx50 futures, Eurex EUR 10 372,229,766 
6 Euro Stoxx50 index options, Eurex EUR 10 284,707,318 
7 RTS index futures, RTS USD 2 224,696,733 
8 S&P 500 index options, CBOE USD 100 175,291,508 
9 S&P CNX Nifty index futures, NSE (India) INR 100 156,351,505 
10 Nikkei225 Mini futures, OSE JPY 100 125,113,769 
Note. This table shows the 10 most active derivatives contracts for index futures and options. The 
contracts are ranked by the number of contracts traded and/or cleared in 2010. The SPDR S&P 500 




Trading Activity by Investor Types 
Investor Group Total (in contracts) Percentage (%) 
Domestic individuals 20,400,597,212  42.3  
Domestic institutions 18,065,933,152  37.4  
Foreigners 9,777,346,354  20.3  
Total 48,243,876,718  100.0  
Note. The table presents summary statistics for trading activity in the KOSPI200 options market by 
investor type (domestic individuals, domestic institutions, and foreigner investors) for the period 
between January 2002 and December 2010. Trading activity is indicated by the number of 
contracts. 
Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Options 
Panel A. KOSPI200 index 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Index value 160.58 54.27 65.58 168.23 271.19 
 
Panel B. Call options 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Number 9.97 3.75 1 9 20 
Moneyness -0.618 2.364 -11.160 -0.540 13.280 
Time to maturity 0.0423 0.0242 0.0000 0.0407 0.0984 
      
Panel C. Put options 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Number 10.68 3.74 1 10 20 
Moneyness 1.344 2.501 -12.967 0.810 11.690 
Time to maturity 0.0423 0.0242 0.0000 0.0407 0.0984 
Note. This table shows daily summary statistics for KOSPI200 index and for KOSPI200 call and 
put options for the period between January 2002 and December 2010. “Index value” the KOSPI200 
index price. “Number” denotes the number of call options, “Moneyness” for call options the 
average difference between their index value and strike price for a given day, “Moneyness” for put 
options the average difference between their strike price and index value for a given day, and 




Percentage Price Differences between Option-Implied and Observed Values of the Underlying 
Index 
Panel A. Call options 
  Mean Std.dev Min Median Max t-stat. 
Parametric             
BS 0.1409 0.3235 -0.6829 0.1192 1.7932 18.1990 
Longstaff -0.0583 0.4281 -1.5143 -0.0005 1.3643 -5.6983 
Brenner & Eom -0.5622 2.2830 -13.0110 -0.5856 7.8536 -10.3180 
       
Non-Parametric       
Shimko 0.0318 0.1666 -0.6113 0.0366 0.6392 7.9278 
Kernel Regression 1.2908 0.9253 -2.3719 1.3101 3.6328 58.4900 
       
Panel B. Put options 
  Mean Std.dev Min Median Max t-stat. 
Parametric             
BS 0.2055 0.5226 -0.7114 0.0902 2.7967 16.7660 
Longstaff -0.0315 0.5842 -1.6151 -0.0942 2.7712 -2.3032 
Brenner & Eom -1.8905 4.9912 -25.3970 0.2562 2.3973 -16.1900 
       
Non-Parametric       
Shimko 0.0292 0.1634 -0.5722 0.0336 0.6411 7.5911 
Kernel Regression -1.1832 0.9630 -3.7124 -1.1878 2.0265 -52.4750 
Note. This table presents the summary statistics for percentage differences between option-implied 
and market-observed values of the underlying index for call and put options. Here t-statistics are 
used for the null hypothesis H0 that there is no difference. The critical values are 1.646, 1.962, and 
2.580 for the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively, for the two-tailed t-test. 
Table 5 
Estimates of the Bandwidth h in Kernel Regressions 
Panel A. Call options      
  Index value Strike price Time to maturity Risk free rate (%) R2 
Kernel Regression 0.6084 1.1597 0.0088 0.0005 0.9881
      
Panel B. Put options      
  Index value Strike price Time to maturity Risk free rate R2 
Kernel Regression 0.5947 1.2006 0.0085 0.0004 0.9779
Note. This table shows the estimates of the bandwidth h, which are obtained by minimizing the 
least squares cross-validation. The kernel regression (KR) method is four-dimensional with option 
price as the dependent variable. R2 is the adjusted R-squared value.
 
Table 6 
Regression Analysis using KOSPI200 Index Values 
Panel A. Call options 
  C BA OI TTV N R2 
Parametric            
BS -0.1808*** -0.6994 -0.9504*** 0.0016*** 0.0360*** 0.2015
P-value 0.0000 0.1260 0.0001 0.0047 0.0000  
Longstaff -0.2490*** 1.0790 0.1101 -0.0004 0.0154*** 0.0138
P-value 0.0000 0.1073 0.7557 0.6448 0.0000  
Brenner & Eom -0.5315** -15.3850*** 8.9319*** -0.0098** -0.0077 0.0120
P-value 0.0114 0.0000 0.0000 0.0257 0.6520  
       
Non-Parametric       
Shimko -0.0469*** -0.4470* -0.3707*** 0.0006* 0.0101*** 0.0667
P-value 0.0017 0.0874 0.0054 0.0694 0.0000  
Kernel Regression 2.9432*** -3.2882*** -3.3692*** -0.0003 -0.1179*** 0.2459
P-value 0.0000 0.0098 0.0000 0.8660 0.0000   
       
Panel B. Put options 
  C BA OI TTV N R2 
Parametric            
BS 0.1256*** 5.2247*** -6.0406*** 0.0039*** 0.0293*** 0.1252
P-value 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Longstaff 0.0989* 3.0889*** -0.6989 0.0020** -0.0197*** 0.0219
P-value 0.0666 0.0005 0.1603 0.0322 0.0000  
Brenner & Eom -3.7303*** 23.5540*** -6.2187 -0.0137 0.1976*** 0.0140
P-value 0.0000 0.0019 0.1498 0.1023 0.0000  
       
Non-Parametric       
Shimko -0.0048 0.0780 -0.7832*** 0.0003 0.0079*** 0.0491
P-value 0.7481 0.7602 0.0000 0.3071 0.0000  
Kernel Regression -3.3364*** 8.6515*** 2.2135*** 0.0058*** 0.1388*** 0.3640
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000   
Note. This table shows the coefficient estimates and p-values obtained from the regression of 
percentage differences between option-implied index values and market-observed index values on 
variables for market friction. Here C denotes the regression intercept, BA the bid-ask adjusted 
spread, OI the open interest, TTV the total trading volume, and N the number of call/put options for 
a given day. The coefficients for OI and TTV are multiplied by 107 and 1010 respectively; R2, 
adjusted R-squared value for the regression. 
 
Table 7 
Full Regression Analysis using KOSPI200 Index values 
Panel A. Call options      
  C T M BA OI TTV N ARet ARet-1 ARet-2 R2 
Parametric                      
BS -0.2639*** -1.1502*** 0.0247*** 0.0480 -0.5633** 0.0003 0.0420*** 1.4456*** 2.6053*** 2.1933*** 0.2521 
P-value 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.9269 0.0294 0.5777 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000  
Longstaff -0.1687*** -2.9963*** 0.0426*** 2.0964*** -0.2434 -0.0015* 0.0243*** 1.0770 1.4171* 1.0303 0.0751 
P-value 0.0081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0065 0.5211 0.0900 0.0000 0.1769 0.0702 0.1858  
Brenner & Eom -0.1115 -2.3152 0.1519*** -8.3229* 4.7917** -0.0052 -0.0034 -8.3631* -4.5511 -3.3170 0.0313 
P-value 0.7488 0.4855 0.0000 0.0537 0.0220 0.2735 0.8523 0.0589 0.2913 0.4381  
Non-Parametric            
Shimko -0.0761*** -0.2902 -0.0007 -0.6096** -0.1312 0.0001 0.0115*** 0.6486** 0.7011** 0.7076** 0.0740 
P-value 0.0023 0.2234 0.7171 0.0458 0.3781 0.8548 0.0000 0.0351 0.0207 0.0180  
Kernel Regression 2.6801*** 3.7510*** -0.1763*** -10.7520*** -0.2292 -0.0029* -0.1313*** -1.0596 4.1431*** 4.3685*** 0.4043 
P-value 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.7272 0.0542 0.0000 0.4426 0.0022 0.0011   
                 
Panel B. Put options           
  C T M BA OI TTV N ARet ARet-1 ARet-2 R2 
Parametric                      
BS -0.0395 1.8903*** -0.1012*** 3.0611*** -5.9941*** 0.0044*** 0.0110*** 4.3493*** 4.5522*** 3.6823*** 0.2967 
P-value 0.5667 0.0037 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Longstaff 0.2545*** 0.7160 -0.0649*** 1.0804 -1.6748*** 0.0039*** -0.0372*** -1.1559 0.9310 -1.5410 0.0747 
P-value 0.0038 0.3881 0.0000 0.2635 0.0018 0.0001 0.0000 0.3021 0.3897 0.1558  
Brenner & Eom -4.1474*** 16.5280** -0.2981*** 21.0870** -8.0737* -0.0024 0.1070** -11.5500 7.8706 6.9116 0.0305 
P-value 0.0000 0.0234 0.0000 0.0130 0.0857 0.7799 0.0106 0.2471 0.4150 0.4775  
Non-Parametric            
Shimko -0.0416* 0.0758 -0.0053*** -0.0179 -0.6690*** 0.0001 0.0077*** 0.6381** 0.5175* 0.7503** 0.0576 
P-value 0.0967 0.7471 0.0046 0.9501 0.0000 0.6484 0.0000 0.0411 0.0889 0.0138  
Kernel Regression -3.2506*** -6.4875*** 0.1640*** 11.2880*** 3.4124*** 0.0008 0.1853*** 1.5619 -3.0887** -2.8447** 0.4955 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4822 0.0000 0.2688 0.0229 0.0373   
Note. This table shows the coefficients estimates and p-values obtained from the regression of percentage differences between option-implied index values 
and market-observed index values on selected independent variables. Panel A shows the results for call options, and Panel B, those for put options. Here C 
denotes the regression intercept, T the average time to maturity, M the average moneyness of all call/put options for a given day, BA the bid-ask adjusted 
spread, OI the open interest, TTV the total trading volume, N the number of call/put options for a given day, and ARet, ARet-1, and ARet-2 are the current, first 
lagged, and second lagged values of absolute daily returns on the KOSPI200 index. The coefficients for OI and TTV are multiplied by 107 and 1010, 








Percentage Differences between Option-Implied and Market-Observed Index Futures Prices 
Panel A. Call options 
  Mean Std.dev Min Median Max t-stat. 
Parametric             
BS 0.2720 0.3201 -0.3854 0.2122 1.7336 20.2160 
Longstaff 0.0959 0.4499 -1.3135 0.0591 1.6601 5.0728 
Brenner & Eom -0.1055 2.2273 -7.6642 -0.3868 9.7409 -1.1289 
       
Non-Parametric       
Shimko 0.0527 0.1699 -0.5797 0.0593 0.6452 7.3443 
Kernel Regression -1.1949 1.3056 -3.7516 -1.3131 1.9559 -21.7530 
       
Panel B. Put options 
  Mean Std.dev Min Median Max t-stat. 
Parametric             
BS 0.3445 0.4591 -0.3358 0.2322 2.8555 18.3030 
Longstaff 0.0914 0.5794 -1.2332 0.0099 3.0468 3.8547 
Brenner & Eom -1.8687 5.4333 -27.1480 0.4811 2.3210 -8.4176 
       
Non-Parametric       
Shimko 0.0511 0.1715 -0.5682 0.0621 0.6510 7.2441 
Kernel Regression -0.9344 1.1253 -3.8418 -0.9773 2.7370 -20.2890 
Note. This table shows the summary statistics for percentage differences between option-implied 
and market-observed futures prices for call and put options. Here t-statistics are used for the null 
hypothesis H0 that there is no difference. The critical values are 1.6487, 1.9659, and 2.5882 for the 




Regression Analysis using KOSPI200 Index Futures Values 
Panel A. Call options 
  C BA OI TTV N R2 
Parametric            
BS 0.2349*** 1.1877 -3.8107*** 0.0031*** 0.0239*** 0.2239 
P-value 0.0000 0.1309 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000  
Longstaff 0.2691*** 2.8768** -2.5459*** 0.0003 -0.0025 0.0314 
P-value 0.0002 0.0202 0.0001 0.8541 0.6592  
Brenner & Eom -0.5240 -2.3327 1.9411 0.0030 0.0192 -0.0026
P-value 0.1375 0.7101 0.5515 0.6729 0.4999  
       
Non-Parametric       
Shimko 0.0271 0.1700 -1.2044*** 0.0008 0.0098*** 0.0968 
P-value 0.2900 0.7143 0.0000 0.1235 0.0000  
Kernel Regression 0.9559*** 19.2750*** -16.9590*** 0.0203*** -0.1711*** 0.3593 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
       
Panel B. Put options 
  C BA OI TTV N R2 
Parametric            
BS 0.2658*** 2.1809** -5.6957*** 0.0040*** 0.0337*** 0.1994 
P-value 0.0001 0.0474 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000  
Longstaff 0.4113*** -1.6660 0.3410 0.0009 -0.0298*** 0.0221 
P-value 0.0000 0.2764 0.7189 0.5790 0.0001  
Brenner & Eom -5.5717*** 12.8890 17.1130** -0.0518*** 0.3241*** 0.0415 
P-value 0.0000 0.3658 0.0493 0.0006 0.0000  
       
Non-Parametric       
Shimko 0.0044 0.0171 -1.1473*** 0.0010** 0.0098*** 0.0981 
P-value 0.8662 0.9695 0.0000 0.0332 0.0000  
Kernel Regression -3.2236*** 2.6033 2.2452 0.0066*** 0.1606*** 0.3858 
P-value 0.0000 0.2708 0.1238 0.0097 0.0000   
Note. This table shows the coefficients estimates and t-statistics obtained from the regression of 
percentage differences between option-implied values of index futures and market-observed prices 
of index futures on variables for market friction. Here C denotes the regression intercept, BA the 
bid-ask adjusted spread, OI the open interest, TTV the total trading volume, and N the number of 
call/put options for a given day. The coefficients for OI and TTV are multiplied by 107 and 1010, 




Percentage Price Differences between Option-Implied and Observed Values of the Underlying 
Index for Two Sub-Samples 
Panel A. First sample (Jan, 2002 ~ May, 2007) 
Call options Mean Std.dev Min Median Max t-stat. 
Parametric           
BS 0.0231 0.2526 -0.8368 0.0492 0.8306 2.9819 
Longstaff -0.0996 0.4420 -1.5982 -0.0048 1.1162 -7.3479 
Brenner & Eom -0.4423 2.1079 -9.6619 -0.5794 8.3980 -6.8477 
Non-Parametric      
Shimko -0.0033 0.2156 -0.7209 0.0085 0.7503 -0.5001 
Kernel Regression 1.5201 0.7351 -0.8620 1.4991 3.4769 67.4850 
  
Put options Mean Std.dev Min Median Max t-stat. 
Parametric           
BS 0.0222 0.3334 -0.8565 0.0063 1.2173 2.2192 
Longstaff -0.0581 0.5691 -1.6514 -0.1053 1.7564 -3.3982 
Brenner & Eom -2.3695 5.4523 -28.5350 -0.1741 1.9371 -14.4980 
Non-Parametric      
Shimko -0.0030 0.2134 -0.7692 0.0129 0.7912 -0.4695 
Kernel Regression -1.5104 0.8559 -4.1656 -1.3975 0.8288 -58.9260 
       
Panel B. Second sample (June, 2007 ~ Dec, 2010) 
Call options Mean Std.dev Min Median Max t-stat. 
Parametric           
BS 0.3241 0.3836 -0.3337 0.2404 2.2616 22.1260 
Longstaff -0.0052 0.4142 -1.0470 0.0122 1.8061 -0.3314 
Brenner & Eom -0.7056 2.4943 -14.5370 -0.5821 7.8536 -7.4306 
Non-Parametric      
Shimko 0.0769 0.0936 -0.1769 0.0685 0.5457 21.5190 
Kernel Regression 0.9231 1.0844 -2.6118 0.9625 3.8246 22.3770 
       
Put options Mean Std.dev Min Median Max t-stat. 
Parametric           
BS 0.4915 0.7082 -0.4576 0.2943 4.4202 18.5420 
Longstaff 0.0123 0.6540 -1.6081 -0.0775 4.0529 0.5016 
Brenner & Eom -1.2338 4.3331 -24.6650 0.6052 2.8872 -7.6033 
Non-Parametric      
Shimko 0.0729 0.0932 -0.1777 0.0629 0.4960 20.8420 
Kernel Regression -0.7091 0.9813 -2.9215 -0.8187 2.6366 -19.2950 
Note. This table presents the summary statistics for percentage differences between option-implied 
and market-observed values of the underlying index for call and put options for two sub-samples; 
one is from January, 2002 to May, 2007, the other one is from June, 2007 to December, 2010. Here 
t-statistics are used for the null hypothesis H0 that there is no difference. The critical values are 




Option Pricing Performance Comparison 
Panel A. Call options      
  Mean Std.dev Min Median Max 
Parametric      
BS -0.0119  0.1419  -2.4221  -0.0124  2.5938  
Longstaff 0.0021  0.1050  -1.9351  0.0016  2.7289  
Brenner & Eom -0.0121  0.3652  -3.8024  -0.0029  3.9965  
      
Non-Parametric      
Shimko 0.0032  0.1188  -1.1104  -0.0010  3.5288  
Kernel Regression 0.0116  0.2075  -1.6783  -0.0079  1.7783  
      
Panel B. Put options      
  Mean Std.dev Min Median Max 
Parametric      
BS 0.0338  0.1662  -1.6974  0.0399  2.9244  
Longstaff 0.0024  0.0981  -1.7752  0.0022  2.6353  
Brenner & Eom -0.0227  0.2189  -2.9814  -0.0027  3.9683  
      
Non-Parametric      
Shimko 0.0014  0.1168  -1.7983  0.0008  3.0643  
Kernel Regression 0.0133  0.2233  -1.4474  -0.0082  1.9106  
Note. This table shows the statistics of option pricing errors for all five models, the whole data 
sample is used, where pricing errors are defined as the differences between observed market prices 
and model prices of options. 
 
 
